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 Abstract 
In this paper it is examined if unification or even harmonisation of the law on se-
curity rights, both on movables, immovables and claims, is at all possible without 
(1) thorough analysis of the property law traditions in Europe, (2) study of the ex-
isting, albeit limited, acquis communautaire in the area of property law and (3) an 
overall framework of European property law, in other words: a common frame of 
reference, as is now being developed with regard to particularly contract law. In 
my Van Gerven lecture “European and national property law: Osmosis or grow-
ing antagonism?” (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995979 ) I 
answered question (1) already negatively. As to the acquis communautaire in the 
area of property law some research has been done and is now being published. It 
is on question (3) that I focus: the need to develop an overall framework of Euro-
pean property law and what the constituent elements of such a framework should 
be. Several policy choices are being discussed: Should more freedom of contract 
in the law of property be allowed? Is there a need for civil law systems to allow 
more flexibility with regard to their unitary concept of ownership? Should protec-
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In 1966 the European Commission published a study called “The development 
of a European capital market”, written by a group of experts chaired by Clau-
dio Segré. In this so-called “Segré report”, the experts advised to introduce a 
European type of mortgage to facilitate the coming into existence of a Euro-
pean capital market. In what may seem somewhat cryptic terms the reports 
states:1 
“The approximation or harmonization of the legal status of the real-estate 
sureties required in the Member States should be given priority. More flexible 
and less burdensome than the mortgage, the "land-charge deed" technique (...) 
is an instrument which might usefully be adapted to the financing of building. 
And arrangements should be made so that mortgage or land-charge deed reg-
istrations can be expressed in currencies other than that of the country of reg-
istration.” 
The “land-charge deed” technique referred to is the German Grundschuld, a 
non-accessory mortgage on immovables. The report explains this technique as 
follows:2 
“In all the Member States, real-estate charges play an important role as secu-
rity for long-term credit, despite the problems which may arise in enforcing a 
claim where the buildings or land mortgaged form pan of an industrial com-
plex that is difficult to split up.” 
German experience suggests a technique which may be of particular interest in 
international credit operations. In this country the mortgage has largely been 
supplanted by the land charge (Grundschuld) for industrial financing and for 
the financing of house building. 
This procedure has proved simpler than that of mortgage registration, which 
is often both lengthy and costly. The land charge is an abstract lien on real es-
tate, which arises or is extinguished independently of the claim it secures. 
Where a land charge deed is issued, it may be assigned without necessitating 
any new entry in the land register (Grundbuch). In the same way, once the loan 
has been repaid, the deed is again transferred to the owner of the asset and is 
available to secure a further credit. The land charge is divisible. It also lends 
itself to the securing of credit operations on current account. 
                                                 
1 Segré Report, p. 169. The report can be found electronically at: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter1/19661130en382develeurocapit 
m_c.pdf>. 
2 Segré report, p. 152 and 153. 
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The report also addresses the question whether a mortgage can be denomi-
nated in a foreign currency:3 
“A closely related question is that of denominating mortgages in currencies 
other than that of the country in which the asset is situated. In Italy and Lux-
embourg this can already be done; if similar legislation were introduced by 
the other member countries, the conclusion of international lending transac-
tions backed by real-estate liens would become easier.” 
The latter problem was solved by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 
Trummer v. Mayer ruling, in which the Court decided that it was a violation of 
European law (Article 73b of the EC Treaty, now Article 56 EC) if national 
rules required a mortgage securing a debt payable in the currency of another 
Member State to be registered in the national currency.4 After the introduction 
of the Euro this problem has disappeared in situations where Member States 
within the Euro zone were involved, but it still exists in cases where a mort-
gage is expressed in, to give an example, British pounds sterling and registra-
tion has to take place outside the United Kingdom. A far greater and also far 
more difficult controversial point is what the Segré report remarked about the 
introduction of a uniform type of mortgage, modelled on the basis of German 
law. That it was a controversial point becomes clear if one realises that it took 
until 1988 before any follow-up initiative was taken.5 
After publication of the Segré report the focus changed quickly to security 
interests on movable property and claims. In 1972 the European Commission 
published a study entitled “The Law of Property in the European Community”, 
written by Wulf Gravenhorst, Trevor Hartley and Ole Lando. Gravenhorst 
wrote about the laws of the founding members of the European Union (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands), Hartley dis-
cussed the United Kingdom and Ireland and Lando examined Danish law with 
some commentary on Norwegian law. The purpose of the study was to prepare 
unification of private international law in the area of property law, focussing 
                                                 
3 Segré report, p. 153. 
4 European Court of Justice 16 March 1999, Case C 222-97, Trummer v. Mayer, to be 
found electronically at the website of the ECJ: <http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/ 
transitpage.htm>. 
5 Union Internationale du Notariat Latin/Commission des Affaires Européennes, La cé-
dule hypothécaire suisse et la dette foncière allemande – Étude comparative, base 
d’une future Euro-hypothèque (Amsterdam: Stichting tot Bevordering der Notariële 
Wetenschap, 1988). For an overview of the developments and further references to le-
gal literature see H.G. Wehrens, Real security regarding immovable objects – Reflec-
tions on a Euro-Mortgage, in: A. Hartkamp (et al., eds.), Towards a European Civil 
Code (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/ Kluwer Law International, 2004), p. 769 ff. 
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on security interests on movable property. The study is remarkable from sev-
eral points of view. First of all, it is based on the assumption that unification of 
private international law in the European Communities would only be possible 
after a thorough comparative examination of substantive property law as it was 
applied in the various Member States. Secondly, a study on English, Scottish, 
Irish and Danish law (with some aspects of Norwegian law) was added, al-
though the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark had not yet become mem-
bers of the European Communities. This only happened on January 1, 1973. 
Nevertheless, in the minds of the authors a growing awareness must have ex-
isted that as soon as these three states would become members of the (then) 
European Communities, a considerable legal diversity would result, especially 
in the area of property law. Thirdly, the main focus was on security rights on 
movables.6 Reflecting upon these three aspects of this study, it becomes appar-
ent that already more than 45 years ago it was clear that with regard to security 
interests on movables initiatives to unify at least the rules of private interna-
tional law were badly needed, but that any attempts to reach harmonisation 
were hampered by the existing legal diversity. However, unification or even 
harmonisation of the substantive rules of property law was out of the question. 
No doubt it was considered to be too complicated and it was feared that finding 
common ground between Civil Law, Common Law, the Scandinavian legal 
traditions and the mixed legal systems would prove to be too cumbersome and 
most likely impossible. The main reason for this fear seems to have been that 
property law was considered to be a national system of coherent choices, safe-
guarded by mandatory law while limiting the parties’ freedom to create new or 
give shape to existing property rights. This can be detected in the introductory 
remarks made by Gravenhorst in his part on the laws of the six founding 
Member States. He writes as follows:7 
“A description of the types of security on movables in the legal system of dif-
ferent countries cannot be restricted to the portrayal in isolation of individual 
legal concepts such as, say, retention of title. In order to grasp the full eco-
nomic and legal significance of the different types of security, it is necessary 
to have regard to the position they occupy in relation to the remainder of the 
                                                 
6 It is not really clear whether in English it should be “right in”, “right on”, “right over” 
or “right in respect to” a movable, an immovable or a claim. The same linguistic prob-
lem arises with regard to the use of the word “interest”. If the movable, immovable or 
claim is seen as the object of the right, then probably “right on” or “interest on” 
should be used. In comparative legal literature all variations can be found. In the fol-
lowing, unless reference is made to writings by a particular author, I have used “right 
on” or “interest on” a movable, an immovable or a claim. 
7 The law of property in the European Community. Studies, Competition – Approxima-
tion of legislation series No. 27, Brussels, December 1972, p. 13. 
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civil law system in question. Thus in the case of contracts of sale, for exam-
ple, the full implication of retention of title does not become apparent until 
one has at least glanced at the other legal relationships between seller and 
buyer.” 
This report was followed in 1974 by the publication of a study on security over 
corporeal movables, edited by Jean Georges Sauveplanne, which contained 
various papers presented to a colloquium on security over corporeal movables, 
organised in 1971 by the United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative 
Law in Edinburgh.8 In his concluding remarks Sauveplanne, while referring to 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth (“And you all know: security is mortals’ chiefest en-
emy”), summarises the existing diversity in the legal systems which are being 
dealt with in the various national reports by, on the one hand, showing the 
enormous diversity at a technical level and, on the other hand, also showing 
the leading thought patterns underlying the various technical solutions.9 These 
can be summarised as follows. (1) Ownership and limited property rights are 
both used to secure payment of a debt. Ownership in the hands of the creditor 
for security purposes (be it as the result of a retention of title by or a transfer of 
title to the creditor) is seen not as full, but as limited ownership, giving the 
owner the same rights as the holder of a security interest. In other words: for-
mal ownership no longer implies all of the entitlements an owner has. (2) Pos-
sessory security rights are not compatible with modern financing techniques, 
resulting in a preference for non-possessory security arrangements. (3) Liens 
and preferential rights may function as quasi-property rights. Inspired by his 
analysis of the underlying thought patterns it can be no surprise that Sauve-
planne felt strongly attracted by the uniform security interest laid down in Ar-
ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Article 9 is based on a func-
tional approach, merging the use of ownership as security and limited property 
rights into one unitary security interest, which is characterised further by its 
non-possessory nature and the requirement that, in order to be “perfect”, a no-
tice of the security interest must be registered.10 
As was the case with mortgages on immovables, also with regard to secu-
rity interests on movables nothing really happened at a European level until 
things began to change some 10 years ago. The deepening (as a result of grow-
ing cross border trade) and widening (following the accession of new Member 
                                                 
8 J.G. Sauveplanne (ed.), Security over corporeal movables (Leyden: A.W. Sijthof, 
1974). 
9 Sauveplanne, Security over corporeal movables, p. 295 ff. 
10 For an electronic version of Article 9 UCC see the website of the Legal Information 
Institute of the Cornell University Law School: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/ 
overview.html>.  
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States) of the common and internal market is causing an increasing numbers of 
cases in which problems of private international law arise. This is happening to 
such an extent that there is now growing awareness that either private interna-
tional (property) law will have to be unified or substantive harmonisation or 
unification of (areas of) property law will have to be considered and perhaps 
even both of these developments should take place. Indeed, large areas of pri-
vate international law were – already before, but particularly after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam – unified by European law. Property law, however, was generally 
excluded. The exception was retention of title, but Article 4 of the Late Pay-
ment Directive does not really say much more than that each Member State 
should allow retention of title and that a retention of title agreed upon in an-
other Member State should be recognised in all other Member States according 
to their rules on private international law.11 This can hardly be called unifica-
tion of private international law. A broader attempt with regard to retention of 
title was made in Article 7 of the Insolvency regulation, but again the unifica-
tion effect is limited.12 Furthermore Article 8 of the Regulation states that the 
                                                 
11 Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 
on combating late payment in commercial transactions, OJ L 200, 8.8.2000, p. 35 ff. 
Article 4 of the Directive states:  
“1. Member States shall provide in conformity with the applicable national provisions 
designated by private international law that the seller retains title to goods until they 
are fully paid for if a retention of title clause has been expressly agreed between the 
buyer and the seller before the delivery of the goods.  
2. Member States may adopt or retain provisions dealing with down payments already 
made by the debtor.” 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, OJ L 160, 30.6.2000, p. 1 ff. 
on insolvency proceedings. Article 7 reads:   
“1. The opening of insolvency proceedings against the purchaser of an asset shall not 
affect the seller's rights based on a reservation of title where at the time of the opening 
of proceedings the asset is situated within the territory of a Member State other than 
the State of opening of proceedings.  
2. The opening of insolvency proceedings against the seller of an asset, after delivery 
of the asset, shall not constitute grounds for rescinding or terminating the sale and 
shall not prevent the purchaser from acquiring title where at the time of the opening of 
proceedings the asset sold is situated within the territory of a Member State other than 
the State of the opening of proceedings.  
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not preclude actions for voidness, voidability or unen-
forceability as referred to in Article 4(2)(m).” 
It should, again, be mentioned that a terminological question arises. The Late Payment 
Directive uses the term “retention of title” (which is more the Common Law term), 
whereas the Insolvency Regulation uses the term “reservation of title” (which sounds 
more Civil Law). No doubt, the same legal effect is intended, but terminological cohe-
rence is certainly lacking here. 
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“effects of insolvency proceedings on a contract conferring the right to acquire 
or make use of immoveable property shall be governed solely by the law of the 
Member State within the territory of which the immoveable property is situated” 
and Article 11 adds that the “effects of insolvency proceedings on the rights of 
the debtor in immoveable property, a ship or an aircraft subject to registration in 
a public register shall be determined by the law of the Member State under the 
authority of which the register is kept.” In other words: the lex rei sitae and the 
lex registrationis rules of private international law still apply.13 
It is, at least in part, this failed attempt to unify private international prop-
erty law that led authors such as Kieninger, von Wilmowsky and Rutgers to 
ask the question whether European law as such and in particular the four free-
doms (freedom of goods, persons, services and capital) did not demand that 
recognition of foreign security interests was a duty under European law.14 It 
could be argued that within the European Union (EU) a security interest, val-
idly created in a Member State, is not really a “foreign” security interest any-
more and should therefore be recognised in all other Member States. The ques-
tion can be asked whether decisions by the European Court of Justice in cases 
such as Cassis de Dijon may be seen as an underpinning of such a reasoning.15 
Should security interests within the European Union be mutually recognised, 
irrespective of whether such a security interest could be fitted into the national 
legal system? This may sound a far reaching conclusion, but in essence the ar-
gument is not really very different from what can be found in the “Cassis de 
Dijon” case in which the ECJ forbade the application of a national rule that did 
not allow this liqueur to be marketed in a different Member State than in which 
it had been produced.16 Such an application was considered to be a measure 
                                                 
13 See also Article 5 (third parties’ rights in rem) and Article 14 (protection of third-party 
purchasers) of the Insolvency Regulation. 
14 E.-M. Kieninger, Mobiliarsicherheiten im Europäischen Binnenmarkt. Zum Einfluss 
der Warenverkehrsfreiheit auf das nationale und internationale Sachenrecht der Mit-
gliedstaaten (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); P. von Wilmowsky, Europäisches Kredit-
sicherungsrecht. Sachenrecht und Insolvenzrecht unter dem EG-Vertrag, 60 (Beiträge 
zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck, 1996); J.W. Rutgers, International Reservation of Title Clauses. A study of 
Dutch, French and German Private International Law in the Light of European Law 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999);  
15 ECJ 20 February 1979, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein, Case 120/78, “Cassis de Dijon”, [1979] ECR 648, also to be found via 
Eur-Lex: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>.  
16 The ECJ ruled as follows: “8. In the absence of common rules relating to the produc-
tion and marketing of alcohol – a proposal for a regulation submitted to the Council 
by the Commission on 7 December 1976 ( Official Journal C 309, p. 2 ) not yet hav-
ing received the Council’ s approval – it is for the Member States to regulate all mat-
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having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports, as meant in 
Article 30 EEC Treaty. What was produced in a Member State according to the 
rules of that Member State should be marketable in all the other Member 
States. Then why not accept that a security interest, lawfully created in a 
Member State, should be recognised (“marketable”) in a different Member 
State? I do not intend to answer all the questions raised above, but it might be 
interesting to look at one particular point. Could the unity of a national system 
of property law perhaps be a counter argument? Could a case be made that, as 
a system of coherent choices protecting legal certainty and promoting predict-
able outcomes of legal disputes which in the area of property law with its long 
term relations are of high value, property law is exempt from a Cassis de Dijon 
line of reasoning? That can be doubted. 
It seems, first of all, that Article 295 EC (“This Treaty shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property owner-
ship”). does not play a major role in the development of European property 
law.17 See for instance the decisions of the ECJ in Klaus Konle v. Republic 
Austria (“although the system of property ownership continues to be a matter 
for each Member State under Article 295 EC, that provision does not have the 
effect of exempting such a system from the fundamental rules of the Treaty”) 
and the decision in the Tobacco case (“[t]hat provision merely recognises the 
power of Member States to define the rules governing the system of property 
ownership and does not exclude any influence whatever of Community law on 
the exercise of national property rights”).18 Secondly, it seems that the ECJ is 
                                                                                                                                                      
ters relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on 
their own territory.  
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the 
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in 
so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervi-
sion, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the 
defence of the consumer.” 
17 Cf. on the property provisions in the Euratom Treaty P. Mathijsen, Problems con-
nected with the creation of Euratom, Law and Contemporary Problems 1961, p. 438 
ff., 447 ff.; P. Böhm, Ownership of nuclear materials in Euratom, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1962, p. 167 ff. See Articles 86 ff. Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
18 ECJ 1 June 1999, Klaus Konle v Republic Austria, Case C-302/97, [1999] ECR I-3099, 
recital 38 and ECJ 10 December 2002, Tobacco case, Case C-491/01, [2002] ECR I-
11456, recital 147. All recent ECJ decisions are available electronically at: 
<http://curia.europa.eu/en/transitpage.htm>. See also M.W. Hesselink, J.W. Rutgers and 
T. de Booys, The legal basis for an optional instrument on European contract law, Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law, Short study for 
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moving gradually into the area of substantive property law. I refer to the 
Trummer v. Mayer case, earlier mentioned.19 Another example of the court’s 
growing involvement with property law questions are the so-called “golden 
share” cases: the holding of shares with a special status by a Member State 
which allow that state to control a company.20 By not allowing golden shares, 
the ECJ in fact is limiting the rights of shareholders, thus limiting their prop-
erty entitlements. The ECJ also decided recently that in a situation where both 
the contract for the sale of immovable property and the agreement on transfer 
of ownership of that property have been concluded before the date on which 
the buyer is included in a list of people suspected of terrorist activities and 
where the sale price has also been paid before that date, Article 2(3) of Regula-
tion (EC) No 881/2002, as amended by Regulation No 561/2003, must be in-
terpreted as prohibiting the final registration, in performance of that contract, 
of the transfer of ownership in the Land Register subsequent to that date.21 In 
other words: EU anti-terrorism measures can have a direct impact on national 
property law. The question which is now under review by the ECJ is whether 
the decision to put a person on this black list can be reviewed or not in the light 
                                                                                                                                                      
the European Parliament on the different options for a future instrument on a Common 
Frame of Reference (CFR) in EU contract law, in particular the legal form and the legal 
basis for any future optional instrument, Final report – 31 October 2007, Working Paper 
Series No. 2007/04, electronically available at: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1091119, p. 57/58. 
19 Case C-222/97. 
20 Cf. ECJ 4 June 2002, Commission v. Portugal, Case C-367/98, Commission v. France, 
Case C-483/99 and Commission v. Belgium, Case C-503/99. In the latter case the 
Court stated:   
“43. (...), it is undeniable that, depending on the circumstances, certain concerns may 
justify the retention by Member States of a degree of influence within undertakings 
that were initially public and subsequently privatised, where those undertakings are 
active in fields involving the provision of services in the public interest or strategic 
services (...).  
44. However, those concerns cannot entitle Member States to plead their own systems 
of property ownership, referred to in Article 222 of the Treaty, by way of justification 
for obstacles, resulting from privileges attaching to their position as shareholder in a 
privatised undertaking, to the exercise of the freedoms provided for by the Treaty. As 
is apparent from the Court’s case-law (Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099, pa-
ragraph 38), that article does not have the effect of exempting the Member States' sys-
tems of property ownership from the fundamental rules of the Treaty.”   
See also recently the decision about the “VW Gesetz”: ECJ 23 October 2007, Com-
mission v. Germany, Case C- 112/05 , more in particular the opinion by the Advocate-
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, nrs. 48 and 49. 
21 ECJ 11 October 2007, Möllendorf , Case C-117/06, (to be found electronically at: 
<http://www.curia.europa.eu>).  
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of, among other points, the right to property.22 Thirdly, decisions by the ECJ 
concerning this same argument in the area of social security show that with re-
gard to property law a, what might be called, European legal method is devel-
oping. Time and time again, Member States have argued that their social secu-
rity system is a matter for national law, because otherwise interference by the 
European Union might result in severe disruption of the system as a conse-
quence of financial imbalance. In the Stamatelaki case the ECJ, following ear-
lier case law, accepted this argument in part, but also rejected it in part:23 
“23. Whilst it is settled case-law that Community law does not detract from 
the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and 
that, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the legisla-
tion of each Member State to determine the conditions in which social secu-
rity benefits are granted, when exercising that power Member States must 
comply with Community law, in particular the provisions on the freedom to 
provide services. Those provisions prohibit the Member States from introduc-
ing or maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of that freedom in 
the healthcare sector (...)” 
It could perhaps be said by analogy that also with regard to property law main-
taining a balanced system is of great value and that it is within the power of the 
Member States to organise their own property law system and that, in absence 
of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the legislation of each Member 
State to determine the conditions in which a property right is granted (in-
cluded, I would like to add: how a property right is transferred as well as ter-
minated). However, when granting property rights Member States must com-
ply with Community law. This is precisely what can be seen in such recent 
property law cases as Trummer v. Mayer and Möllendorf.  
A beginning has been made with the unification of substantive property 
law. Examples are the Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State and the financial collateral ar-
rangements directive.24 In the area of immovable property law it now seems 
                                                 
22 Court of First Instance 21 September 2005, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation v Council and Commission, Case T-306/01, [2005] ECR II-3533 and Kadi v 
Council and Commission, Case T-315/01, [2005] ECR II-3649; Court of Justice, 
3 September 2008, Kadi v Coucil and Commission, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P. 
23 ECJ 15 April 2007, Aikaterini Stamatelaki v. NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Elefthe-
ron Epangelmation (OAEE), Case C-444/05. 
24 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993, OJ L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74 ff. (with 
amendments); Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements, OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43 ff. Cf. 
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that an attempt to introduce a so-called “euromortgage”, a security right, mod-
elled upon German law (the Grundschuld) and Swiss law, not dependent upon 
the existence of an underlying debt, will not be made. It is submitted that this 
is quite understandable given the mortgage credit crisis that is now heavily af-
fecting financial markets and the resulting “credit crunch”. New mortgage law 
might cause even more instability and should therefore be avoided, at least for 
the time being. The credit crisis has also made apparent very serious problems 
concerning the protection of borrowers of money, secured by a Grundschuld.25 
The contract governing the loan relationship between borrower and 
bank/lender (the Sicherungsvertrag) does not seem to provide sufficient pro-
tection to the borrower vis-à-vis third parties who are the successors of the 
original holder of the non-accessory mortgage. The contract does not create 
sufficient “Ersatzakzessorietät” (in other words adequate connection between 
loan agreement and mortgage).26 It seems that in certain cases the borrower 
cannot invoke the terms of this loan agreement with the original holder of the 
mortgage against the new holder, thus leaving him at the mercy of the new 
mortgagee. This clearly violates even the most basic notions of consumer pro-
tection, a key value in European law.27  
                                                                                                                                                      
also the legal booklet published by the European Central Bank, European legislation 
on financial markets. Settlement Finality Directive, Financial Collateral Directive, 
Winding-up Directive for Credit Institutions (Frankfurt am Main: European Central 
Bank, 2007), p. 34 ff. 
25 See the White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets (presented by 
the Commission), Brussels, 18.12.2007, COM(2007) 807 final. See also on the prob-
lems concerning borrower protection in German law: C. Clemente, Verwertung der 
nicht akzessorischen Grundschuld im Rahmen eines Forderungsverkaufs, Zeitschrift 
für Immobilienrecht 2007, p. 737 ff.  
26 For the concept of “Ersatzakzessorietät” see S. van Erp, Surety agreements and the 
principle of accessority – Personal security in the light of a European property law 
principle, European Review of Private Law 2005, p. 309 ff., 318 ff. 
27 See Article 153 EC Treaty:   
“1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of con-
sumer protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and 
economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, 
education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.  
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and im-
plementing other Community policies and activities.  
3. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred to in 
paragraph 1 through:  
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the completion of the in-
ternal market;  
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Mem-
ber States.  
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A totally different matter is, if unification or even harmonisation of the law 
on security rights, both on movables, immovables and claims, is at all possible 
without (1) thorough analysis of the property law traditions in Europe, (2) 
study of the existing, albeit limited, acquis communautaire in the area of prop-
erty law and (3) an overall framework of European property law, in other 
words: a common frame of reference, as is now being developed with regard to 
particularly contract law.28 In my Van Gerven lecture I answered question (1) 
already negatively.29 My answers to questions (2) and (3) are also negative. As 
to the acquis communautaire in the area of property law some research has 
been done and is now being published.30 It is on question (3) that I would like 
                                                                                                                                                      
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the measures re-
ferred to in paragraph 3(b).  
5. Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must 
be compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be notified of them.” 
28 Cf. Chr. von Bar, E. Clive, H. Schulte-Nölke et al., Principles, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Interim 
Outline Edition, Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Re-
search Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Based in part on a revised version of 
the Principles of European Contract Law (Munich: Sellier European law publishers, 
2008). On 18 April 2008 the Council of European Union (Justice and Home Affairs) 
reached the following conclusions on the status of the CFR (see <http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/99991.pdf>):  
“The Council endorsed a report setting up a Common Frame of Reference for Euro-
pean contract law. That report defines the Council's position on four fundamental as-
pects of the Common Frame of Reference:  
(a) Purpose of the Common Frame of Reference: a tool for better lawmaking targeted 
at Community lawmakers;  
(b) Content of the Common Frame of Reference: a set of definitions, general princi-
ples and model rules in the field of contract law to be derived from a variety of 
sources;  
(c) Scope of the Common Frame of Reference: general contract law including con-
sumer contract law;  
(d) Legal effect of the Common Frame of Reference: a set of non-binding guidelines 
to be used by lawmakers at Community level on a voluntary basis as a common 
source of inspiration or reference in the lawmaking process.  
The report will be communicated to the Commission so that it can take due account of 
it in its future work on the Common Frame of Reference.” 
29 S. van Erp, European and national property law: Osmosis or growing antagonism? 
Sixth Walter van Gerven Lecture (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2006). 
30 See J. Caramelo-Gomes, Unification in the field of property law from the perspective 
of European law, in: W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds.), Rules for the transfer of mo-
vables. A candidate for European harmonisation or national reforms? (Munich: Sellier 
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to focus: the need to develop an overall framework of European property law 
and what the constituent elements of such a framework should be. 
It might perhaps also be good to express what not my intention is. It seems 
that in other areas of European private law than property law, particularly in the 
area of European contract law, academic debate is focussing more and more on 
methodology, sometimes even ideology and legislative politics. In this debate 
fundamental questions are raised (and they should be raised!) on whether the 
comparative legal method is used in a reliable way, what the role of the various 
actors in the process of developing a European private law is or should be and if 
European private law should be aimed at reaching social justice or first and 
foremost be aimed at creating an efficient internal market, which would be best 
served by a “spontaneous” legal order.31 However, it must not be forgotten that 
the actual (comparative) legal work, in spite of all the dangers and pitfalls, also 
has to be done; otherwise nothing will happen. Again – I reiterate what I already 
put forward in my inaugural lecture – I would argue in favour of a more prag-
matic approach, according to which comparative lawyers aim at reaching ade-
quate (in the sense of: justifiable) results.32 There are no good grounds for pro-
claiming, as I summarised the views of some authors in my inaugural lecture, a 
postmodern death of comparative law, or as Siems has formulated it recently the 
“end” of comparative law.33 Comparative legal work will and must go on. Prac-
tising comparative lawyers are very much aware of the methodological prob-
lems they encounter. As long as this awareness exists, they will proceed in an 
adequate way and the outcome of their research will be valuable and, I would 
like to add, reliable. Comparative lawyers can, of course, hold and defend politi-
cal or ideological views, but from my perspective these views should be clearly 
distinguished from evaluating comparative legal research as such. 
                                                                                                                                                      
European Law Publishers, 2008), p. 239 ff. and also P. Sparkes, European Land Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
31 Cf. Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in Europe-
an contract law: a Manifesto, European Law Journal 2004, p. 653 ff.; M. Hesselink, 
The politics of a European Civil Code, European Law Journal 2004, p. 675 ff.; J.M. 
Smits, European private law: A plea for a spontaneous legal order, in: European integ-
ration and law. Four contributions on the interplay between European integration and 
European and national law to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Maastricht University’s 
Faculty of Law (Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), p. 55 ff. 
32 S. van Erp, European private law: postmodern dilemmas and choices. Towards a 
Method of Adequate Comparative Legal Analysis, Vol. 3.1 Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, (August 1999), <http://www.ejcl.org/31/art31-1.html>. 
33 S. van Erp, loc. cit.; M.M. Siems, The end of comparative law, Journal of Compara-
tive Law 2007, p. 133 ff., available electronically at the website of SSRN:  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1066563>. 
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II. Property law as a system of coherent choices 
a. Doctrinal coherence or pragmatism? 
A first point for consideration, when trying to build up a European property 
law, is the question: are we looking for doctrinal coherence, pragmatic solu-
tions or something in between? No doubt, civil lawyers will be inclined to 
stress the first, common lawyers will most likely stress the second approach. 
What I would like to propose is a combination of the two approaches or men-
talities. To be able to decide in a rational and predictable way – rationality and 
predictability are two major aspects of property law! – we will need at least 
some basic theoretical (or doctrinal) coherence. On the other hand, given the 
enormous diversity between in particular Common Law and Civil Law, some 
accommodation with regard to one another’s laws is unavoidable; otherwise no 
European property law can be developed. The development of a European 
property law is, certainly in areas such as security rights, generally seen as de-
sirable to promote intra-European trade. In order to create a common frame-
work the foundations of European property law systems will have to excavated 
and under the surface of technical diversity a search for legal policies, princi-
ples, standards, rules and concepts must start.34 On this occasion I would like 
to look more into the future: Given what the various property law traditions 
share at the level of their foundations, how can this common basis be used as a 
spring board for a future European property law, especially a future European 
law of security rights?  
Before, however, looking at the future, it may be good to summarise what 
the various property law systems have in common. It will be seen that the 
European property law systems as we know today all share certain intellectual 
roots stemming from the nineteenth century. I have called this the “classical 
model of property law”. 
b. The “classical” model of property law 
In a well-known article entitled “Property rules, liability rules and inalienabil-
ity: One view of the cathedral”, published in 1972 in the Harvard Law Review, 
Calabresi and Melamed defended the view that the building of “models” or 
frameworks by legal scholars offer a different and better view of the cathedral 
of the law than a non-systematic analysis.35 The image of the “cathedral” as a 
                                                 
34 I have attempted to make such a start in my above mentioned Van Gerven lecture. 
35 G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One 
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representation of the legal system is based on Monet’s paintings of the cathe-
dral of Rouen, which one should see all to get a complete picture of the cathe-
dral. According to Calabresi and Melamed  
“[f]ramework or model building has two shortcomings. The first is that mod-
els can be mistaken for the total view of phenomena, like legal relationships, 
which are too complex to be painted in any one picture. The second is that 
models generate boxes into which one then feels compelled to force situations 
which do not truly fit. There are, however, compensating advantages. Legal 
scholars, precisely because they have tended to eschew model building, have 
often proceeded in an ad hoc way, looking at cases and seeing what categories 
emerged. But this approach also affords only one view of the Cathedral. It 
may neglect some relationships among the problems involved in the cases 
which model building can perceive, precisely because it does generate boxes, 
or categories.”36 
Although both an ad hoc approach and model building offer only one view of 
the cathedral, the latter offers the opportunity to look at legal problems in an 
integrated way. One viewpoint of the cathedral of property law is its historical 
development, especially the different paths that Common Law and Civil Law 
went following the abolition of the feudal system on the Continent of Europe 
after the French Revolution. It seems, however, that in spite of these different 
paths the two traditions kept developing in a comparable way as a result of 
similar socio-political and socio-economic changes brought about by the In-
dustrial Revolution. Based upon a description of nineteenth century contract 
law by, among others, the Oxford scholar Patrick Atiyah, as a “classical” 
model of contract law, I submit that nineteenth century property law can be 
qualified as a “classical” model of property law.37 
Let me, based upon what I wrote earlier, summarise the core elements of 
this classical model of property law. The basis upon which the model is built is 
a strict separation between personal rights and real rights. Personal rights be-
long to the law of obligations, real rights to the law of property. In both the law 
                                                                                                                                                      
view of the cathedral, Harvard Law Review 1972, p. 1089 ff. 
36 Calabresi and Melamed, ibid., p. 1127/8. 
37 P.S. Atiyah, The rise and fall of freedom of contract (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979, reprint, 1985), p. 681 ff.; S. van Erp, From “classical” to modern Europe-
an property law?, in: N.K. Klamaris, et al. (eds.), Festschrift for Konstantinos D. 
Kerameus (to be published in 2008). Cf. also J. Gordley, Myths of the French Civil 
Code, American Journal of Comparative Law 1994, p. 459 ff. and P. Lecocq, Le Code 
Napoléon, un modéle conservé, in: D. Fairgrieve (ed.), The influence of the French 
Civil Code on the common law and beyond (London: British Institute of Internationl 
and Comparative law, 2007), p. 227 ff. 
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of obligations as well as the law of property the creation of positive burdens 
(i.e. a duty to act) resting on third parties is looked at with great suspicion. The 
essence of a real right is that a holder of such a right is entitled to respect from 
third parties; in other words, on third parties is resting a negative burden. Real 
rights are limited in two ways. They are limited, first of all, by the principle of 
numerus clausus. Only a limited number of real rights with a preset content is 
allowed. Secondly, real rights must be known to third parties, otherwise no jus-
tification exists for their binding nature vis-à-vis these third parties. To put it 
differently, transparency is required: it must be clear upon which object a real 
right will rest and both object and real right must be visible to the outside 
world. Real rights are governed by what I have called certain ground rules. The 
first is the nemo dat rule. No one can transfer more rights than one has. The 
second is the prior tempore rule. Limited rights have priority over fuller rights. 
The third ground rule is that real rights are given special protection, such as in 
the Civil Law the reivindicatio.  
The result of this model is a static approach to property law. Objective cri-
teria are preferred above subjective criteria. Only those rights can come into 
existence which have been preselected by the legislator or, depending upon the 
particular legal system, a court. A formal procedure has to be followed before 
such a right can come into existence, can be transferred and terminated. The 
content of the property right is also preset and only limited input by the parties 
is permitted. The use of special protection and the enforcement of a property 
right is a choice made by its titleholder; only to a very limited degree may 
good faith (in an objective sense) be invoked as an instrument to monitor the 
special protection or enforcement procedure. Good faith (in a subjective sense) 
is only a factor in the decision making process to resolve problems concerning 
the protection of third parties, who thought they had acquired for example 
ownership, but in fact dealt with a non-owner. With regard to its objects the 
classical model of property law focuses on corporeal objects, particularly land; 
this can also be seen when looking at the law of succession as it developed in 
the nineteenth century.38 I submitted, at the end of my analysis in the Van 
Gerven lecture, that the  
“classical model of property law, when brought back to its leading principles 
and ground rules, still applies today, but without the rigour that sometimes 
was so characteristic of its application in the past. This trend towards relaxa-
tion and flexibility is a conditio sine qua non for the development of property 
law in an era characterised by regional and global economic integration, with 
                                                 
38 S. van Erp, New developments in succession law, in: K. Boele-Woelki and S. van Erp, 
General reports of the XVIIth congress of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law (Brussels/Utrecht: Bruylant and Eleven International Publishing, 2007), p. 73 ff. 
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its resulting osmosis between national, European and global property law.”  
It is characteristic of the modern approach to property law to allow the accep-
tance of new objects of property law and to accept new types of property rights. 
An example of a new object is an emission right or, in European terminology, 
“allowance”. The definition can be found in the Directive on the greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme. “Allowance” means an “allowance to emit 
one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period, which shall be 
valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this Directive and 
shall be transferable in accordance with the provisions of this Directive”.39 A 
further example is what is sometimes called, “virtual property”, such as domain 
names, an e-mail address or wireless spectrum.40 The question which then arises 
is how these new objects of property law can be given their place in the existing 
system of property law. Given the different nature of such new objects as, e.g., 
emission rights, the question can be asked if existing property rights can have 
the same content and the same consequences as with regard to traditional objects 
of property rights. Can one really “own” an emission right, as one “owns” a 
house? This raises the question whether new objects of property law result in 
new types of property rights. A further illustration can be found in the field of 
production, transport and sale of energy. The European Commission favours the 
“unbundling” of production and sale from the transport of energy. This can be 
done either by a split up of companies, leading to one company being the pro-
ducer and seller of energy and another company owning the network, but also 
by putting the network into the hands of an independent system operator. Under 
Dutch statutory law this will lead to “economic ownership” in the hands of this 
operator.41 
                                                 
39 Article 3(a) of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275, 
25.10.2003, p. 32 ff. 
40 On wireless spectrum see: Ph.J. Weiser and D. Hatfield, Spectrum policy reform and 
the next frontier of property rights, George Mason Law Review 2008, p. 549 ff., 
available at the SSRN website: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097391>. Cf. also S. van 
Erp, Servitudes: The borderline between contact and (virtual) property, in: S. van Erp 
and B. Akkermans, Towards a unified system of land burdens? (Antwerpen and Ox-
ford: Intersentia, 2006), p. 1 ff. 
41 See Article 1(1)(aa) of the Dutch Electricity Statute, where the following defintion of 
economic ownership (“economische eigendom”) can be found: “het krachtens een 
rechtsverhouding gerechtigd zijn tot alle rechten en bevoegdheden ten aanzien van 
een goed, met uitzondering van het recht op levering, en het gehouden zijn om alle 
verplichtingen ten aanzien van dat goed voor zijn rekening te nemen en daarmee het 
volledige risico van waardeverandering of tenietgaan van het goed te dragen, zonder 
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Another modern development is to draw no longer a rigid line as to whether 
a property right has come into existence or not and whether a property right 
has been terminated or not. Examples are the preliminary registration of a sales 
agreement (Vormerkung) under German law (now also accepted under Dutch 
law), the acceptance of expectation rights (Anwartschaftsrechte) under German 
law and the acceptance under Dutch law that a security right (a non-possessory 
pledge) may not be extinguished entirely when resting on a claim which is 
paid. In case of a preliminary registration a contract of sale is already given 
some proprietary effect, protecting the buyer against e.g. insolvency of the 
seller.42 Expectation rights are the legal reflection of the economic interest a 
buyer under a retention of title clause develops in the goods delivered.43 All 
these rights could be called “pre-proprietary rights”, when analysed from the 
perspective of the traditional catalogue of property rights. Next to these pre-
proprietary rights also post-proprietary rights can be found. The Netherlands 
Supreme Court ruled in a much debated case, which is of enormous impor-
tance for legal practice, that when debtors pay their debt and hence the debt 
has been extinguished, leading to the termination of the right of non-
possessory pledge on that debt, still the former non-possessory pledgor has the 
same priority with regard to the proceeds as if he were still pledgor.44  
A development connected with the above is the growing willingness to al-
low parties more freedom to shape their existing property rights and to develop 
new property rights, if needed. What can be seen clearly is that no legal system 
will allow parties the same freedom with regard to property rights as is given 
them generally with regard to contractual rights. Freedom of contract cannot be 
reciprocated in the law of property as freedom of property. Rights with third 
party effect, in other words: duties that affect the “whole world”, cannot be 
created freely. These rights are of such strength that any legal system must and 
will limit the creation, transfer and termination of these rights. The law of ob-
ligations, particularly the law of contract, with its open textured nature, its 
supplementary rules, open ended norms and standards such as good faith and 
its freedom to shape legal relations by mutual agreement is separated every-
where from the law of property, with its rigid and mandatory rules. It is this 
                                                                                                                                                      
dat het goed geleverd is”. See also Article 1(1)(u) of the Natural Gas Statute. These 
statutes can be found on wetten.overheid.nl.  
42 For German law see: K.H. Schwab and H. Prütting, Sachenrecht (Munich: Verlag 
C.H. Beck, 2006), p. 70 ff.; for Dutch law see article 7:3 Neth. C.C. 
43 F. Baur, J.F. Baur and R. Stürner, Sachenrecht (Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlags-
buchhandlung, 1999), p. 25 ff.  
44 Hoge Raad 17 February 1995, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, 471, Mulder q.q. v. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland. 
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basic structure of the classical model of property law, which can still be found 
everywhere. Nevertheless, borderline areas can be found (lease in the Civil 
Law is a good example), but also developments can be detected in the direction 
of contract law as a supplement of property law or perhaps even as a quasi-
property law. A good example here is the German Grundschuld, already men-
tioned above. The Grundschuld itself is governed by the law of property, but 
the way in which these property rules are applied is limited by the Sicherungs-
vertrag, the contract between lender and borrower in which the terms and con-
ditions of both the loan as well as the right to make use of the Grundschuld by 
the lender are laid down.45 A clear disadvantage from the viewpoint of the bor-
rower is that the protection which the contract gives, although it is a contract 
relating to the applicability of a property right, still is not binding upon third 
parties.The special arrangements for the financial sector in the Financial Col-
lateral Arrangements Directive provide a further example of this tendency to-
wards contractualisation of property law.46 Under this directive the holder of a 
security right is allowed, if agreed upon and albeit under certain conditions, to 
keep the object that was used as security.47 Although this so-called lex com-
missoria is not allowed generally, it is allowed here. The only justification be-
ing the desire by market parties to have this right. Yet another example is the 
acceptance of so-called “reverse mortgages” under which a debt is built up, in-
stead of being paid off. Such mortgages, developed in the U.S., are used by 
banks to release the equity hidden in immovable property belonging to in par-
ticular older people. The bank pays a sum of money to the home owner, who 
gradually builds up a debt, secured by a mortgage. These mortgages (“prêt 
viager hypothècaire”), have now been regulated in statutory format in the 
French Consumer Code, but still remain unregulated in countries such as the 
Netherlands.48 This means that, whenever a legal framework is lacking, it is up 
to the contracting parties (in fact: the financial institution lending the money) 
to give shape to their property relationship. 
These developments show a trend towards more relaxation and flexibility of 
existing property law rules and concepts, without abandoning the basic struc-
ture upon which the classical model of property law is built. Generally, the 
principles of numerus clausus and transparency are applied everywhere. Par-
ties can – as a matter of principle – only create a property right, that was cho-
sen out of a limited number, having followed a formal mandatory procedure. 
                                                 
45 Schwab/Prütting, Sachenrecht, p. 300 ff.  
46 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 
on financial collateral arrangements, OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43 ff. 
47 Cf. Article 4 Financial Collateral Directive. 
48 Articles L-314-1 ff. Consumer Code. 
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An essential part of this procedure is that it must be clear to the outside world 
that the parties both intended to create and did create a property right (public-
ity) on a particular object (specificity). Again, exceptions can be found. In 
Germany the transfer of ownership for security purposes does not need regis-
tration to be effective, in the Netherlands non-possessory pledges are not regis-
tered in a public data base and in the Common Law registration of trusts is not 
always required. Nevertheless the ground structure is clear and it is present 
everywhere. The same applies to the above mentioned ground rules. The spe-
cial protection awarded to property rights is also of general application. It is a 
characteristic of modern property law, however, that this ground structure is 
not seen as carved in stone forever. It is precisely the trend towards relaxation 
and flexibility which will prove vital to the further development of European 
property law. 
c. Modern property law 
The characteristics of modern property law are twofold. First of all, a gradual 
development can be seen towards less rigid rules and concepts and towards the 
development of more open and flexible standards. Secondly, more and more 
new objects of property law, particularly virtual property law, are being recog-
nised. These new objects have to be fitted into (or added to) the “classical” 
catalogue of objects. In the following part of my contribution I will focus on 
the first mentioned characteristic of modern property law. Nevertheless, be-
cause the recognition of new objects of property law is sometimes functioning 
as a catalyst for the development of a less rigid and more flexible system of 
property law, it might be good to devote some attention to the acceptance of 
these new objects of property law. 
Again, I do not want to repeat what I wrote earlier, but it might still be good 
to summarise.49 A clear historical development can be seen from land as the 
prime and most valuable object of property law during feudal times to the 
growing acceptance of the value of movable property during the period of the 
Industrial Revolution.50 Then “decorporealisation” followed: it was more and 
                                                 
49 See S. van Erp, A Numerus quasi-clausus of property rights as a constitutive element 
of a future European property law?, Vol. 7.2, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 
(June 2003), <http://www.ejcl.org/72/art72-2.html> and S. van Erp, Comparative 
property law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, The Oxford handbook of com-
parative law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1043 ff. 
50 One should, of course, be very careful with the use of the term “property law” when 
discussing the feudal era. Property law as we know it today did not exist in that peri-
od. What I mean to say is that what we would now consider to be a “property law 
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more realised that not only corporeal, but also incorporeal objects (claims, but 
also intellectual property) should be recognised as valuable. This was followed 
by Reich’s statement that “new” property should be developed. His theory was 
a recognition of, e.g., public law rights, such as licenses, as objects of property 
law. A recent global and European example of this latter development is the 
creation of emission rights, at a European level preceded by the recognition of 
milk quota, beet quota and pig-breeding rights. Resulting from this acceptance 
of new objects of property law, the question arises whether the traditional rules 
of property law are perhaps written only for the traditional objects of property 
law. Do, to give but one example, the rules on ownership also apply directly to 
these new objects or should new rules be developed? Or, at least, should not it 
be asked whether these rules only apply by analogy, as far as possible? These 
questions are not new. They are the same questions that were asked concerning 
the status of claims. Are claims part of general property law and can they, con-
sequently, be “owned” (the French approach) or should claims be dealt with 
differently (one can only be “entitled” to a claim, the German approach)? Or 
could it be that we should look for middle ground, meaning that the applicabil-
ity of general rules of property law apply, unless the nature of the object makes 
this impossible? A good example is the way in which claims are delivered: this 
is done by deed and not by way of physical transfer of power, as happens in 
the case of movables. It is submitted that perhaps the latter approach, looking 
for middle ground, is the preferred one.  
In my view modern property law cannot be static. Modern economic life 
demands a dynamic approach, aimed at creating openness and flexibility. The 
recognition of new objects of property law is a good example. It is a fact of 
economic life that governments, albeit artificially, create markets by introduc-
ing restricted licensing systems. Wherever restrictions exist, trade will arise 
and a market will be created. A clear example is the trade in airport “slots” be-
tween airlines. This trade has now been accepted as legal by the European 
Commission in a recent communication.51 The moment trade begins, it must 
be clear from a private law point of view what exactly is being traded (what is 
the object of the trade?) and what the rights are concerning that object. Fre-
quency licenses, “bundles” to use a mobile telephone network (giving the 
holder the right to make telephone calls during a limited period of time) are 
                                                                                                                                                      
claim” (e.g. based on being entitled to exclusive use) was a claim focussing on land 
and certain chattels, attached to the land. 
51 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the application of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports, as amended, Brussels, 30.4.2008, COM(2008) 227. 
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further examples of these new objects, which give rise to the questions stated. 
Also the classical borderline between the law of obligations and the law of 
property is no longer carved in stone. Let me take the “bundle” to sue a mobile 
telephone network as an illustration. It could be said that this is a merely con-
tractual right, arising from the contract between a telephone provider and a 
customer. However, from the moment that a contractual right is standardised 
and made anonymous behind, e.g., a telephone SIM card, the contract is only 
the source of the creation of an object: the telephone network “bundle”. It is 
this standardised and faceless right which then becomes itself an object of 
property law. Property law can no longer escape from answering questions 
such as how to qualify these new objects and which property rights (by anal-
ogy) apply. 
d. Security rights in the “classical” model and in modern property 
law 
In the classical model of property law, as applied in Civil Law jurisdictions, 
ownership cannot be used to secure (re)payment of a debt. Retention of title 
and transfer of ownership for security purposes are looked at with great suspi-
cion, as these may result in “fragmented” ownership between a creditor (“legal 
owner”) and a debtor (“economic owner”) and are non-public (secret or “oc-
cult”) forms of security rights, unknown to third parties. It is one of the 
achievements of the classical model that fragmentation of ownership is limited 
(Common Law) or abolished (Civil Law), that all property rights are public 
and not, as could happen in the period before the French Revolution with its 
feudal property law framework, sometimes completely hidden for third parties, 
especially creditors. This explains why a mortgage on immovable property has 
to be registered, why a pledge on movables can only be a possessory security 
right and why a pledge of claims can only be fully effective after notice of the 
pledge has been given to the debtor. Change began when entrepreneurs needed 
at the same time both credit and the continued use of their movables and 
claims, which gave rise to the acceptance of ownership as security and the de-
velopment of non-possessory security rights. 
This latter development is characteristic for modern property law. No abso-
lute choices are being made anymore. A balance must be struck between, on 
the one hand, the legal values of certainty and predictability, which found their 
expression in the numerus clausus principle and the principle of transparency, 
and, on the other hand, the needs of modern commerce. The outcome is a more 
fragmented picture than when looking at the classical model. It is realised 
more and more that, first of all, a distinction must be made between commer-
cial (“B2B”) transactions and consumer (“B2C”) transactions. Within the 
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group of B2B transactions a further distinction has to be made between trans-
actions to which enterprises with a comparable bargaining power are a party 
and transactions between a large enterprise and a small or medium sized enter-
prise (so-called “SME’s”). Secondly, a distinction has to be made depending 
upon the circle and nature of interested third parties. If large financial institu-
tions conclude a security arrangement, less publicity is required than when an 
ordinary company concludes such an arrangement. The reason seems to be that 
within the world of large financial institutions the circle of interested third par-
ties is limited and known; relevant third parties will be large financial institu-
tions themselves. Furthermore, this type of transaction is usually of such a size 
and such an impact that private law institutions, such as a register, no longer 
function properly. Information is not enough to protect third parties. Private 
law controls should be replaced here by public law controls and government 
oversight. 
In the following paragraphs I will sketch how a more flexible approach to 
property law values, principles, policy choices, the use of standards and rules 
may look like, focussing on the situation within the European Union. The new 
model must be flexible and it must be open to change and adaptation, because 
otherwise it will not be able to accommodate the development towards accept-
ing new objects of property law and the corresponding new property rights. It 
must also be transsystemic, as it will have to encompass all the various prop-
erty law traditions in Europe.52 The result will be a dynamic European model 
of property law, which can replace the static classical model of property law, 
which can still be found in the heart of the European national property law sys-
tems. 
                                                 
52 On transsystemic teaching of the law see: A. de Mestral, Guest editorial: Bisystemic 
law-teaching. The McGill programme and the concept of law in the EU, Common 
Market Law Review 2003, p. 799 ff., also to be found electronically on the website of 
the McGill faculty of law: <http://www.mcgill.ca/files/crdpcq/demestral-guest-mcgill 
programme.pdf>. De Mestral concludes (p. 807):  
“Once one begins to approach the teaching of law from a transystemic or multisys-
temic perspective it is quickly apparent that the very nature of law is at stake. The tea-
ching of law at McGill reflects both the coexistence of two legal cultures that meet 
with particular intensity in Québec but also reflects the sense that single jurisdictions 
no longer, if they ever did, contain within themselves a true understanding of the mea-
ning of law. Surely something similar and even more complex is occurring in the EU. 
As this process accelerates, it is important that the process be understood as one of the 
central features of the development of the EU, not only as a legal undertaking but also 
as a human and political community.” 
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III. A view on the future: towards a dynamic, transsystemic 
and more open model of European property law 
a. Introduction 
We have seen that the basic elements of the classical model of property law are 
a strict separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, du-
ties with effect vis-à-vis third parties must be negative, property rights are 
governed by the principle of numerus clausus and the principle of transparency 
and, finally, certain ground rules apply, such as the nemo dat and the prior 
tempore rule. Property rights have a so-called droit de suite (the right follows 
the object upon which it rests) and a droit de préférence (a property right goes 
above any relative rights on an object). Over the years this model led to a static 
approach of property law. This can be seen especially in the Civil Law tradi-
tion, where the numerus clausus principle was strictly adhered to and hence 
fragmentation of ownership was no longer accepted. Allowing such fragmenta-
tion would mean the freedom to unbundle the bundle of rights, which together 
create full ownership, and make it possible to create any new property right the 
parties involved might fancy. This would jeopardise the stability of the prop-
erty law system and is even in Common Law jurisdictions, which know such 
fragmentation especially in equity, restricted.53 Any reintroduction of frag-
mented ownership was rejected outright or looked at with great suspicion. The 
new Dutch Civil Code with its fiducia ban is a prime example.54 This also ex-
plains the rejection of the Common Law trust in Civil Law jurisdictions, as it 
would imply dividing ownership over a manager (“trustee”) and a beneficiary.  
The creation of a common and internal market demands integration of law, 
also of private law and also of property law. It can therefore be no surprise that 
in recent years, more and more European measures can be found which con-
cern property law. Legal integration may be direct (e.g. through directives and 
regulations) or indirect (e.g. recommendations, codes of conduct or, of grow-
ing importance, through unification of private international law rules, resulting 
in forced recognition of “foreign” property rights).55 Without being exhaustive 
                                                 
53 See Keppel v. Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517 and Hill v. Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121. 
54 Article 3:84(3) Netherlands Civil Code. 
55 On the relationship between private international law and Community law see the 
study “The relationship between Community law and private international law”, pre-
pared by the Directorate-General Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department C, 
Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament's 
committee on Legal Affairs (PE 393.245; Brussels, July 2007), to be found at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studiesCom/download.do?file=
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the following areas of existing European property law can be mentioned: pro-
tection of cultural property (to be re-enacted), retention of title, timeshare (to 
be re-enacted), insolvency, financial collateral arrangements, emission trading, 
unbundling of electricity and natural gas networks. Future areas of European 
property law may include: land information service (EULIS), trusts (unifica-
tion of private international succession law; the topic will also be dealt with in 
the Common Frame of Reference or, abbreviated, CFR), uniform certificate of 
inheritance (unification of private international succession law), enforcement 
of maintenance obligations (unification of private international law), frame-
work for the protection of the soil, attachment of bank accounts, debt recovery, 
transfer of movables (to be included in the draft CFR), security rights on mov-
ables (to be included in the draft CFR), personal security rights (already in-
cluded in the draft CFR) and, finally, mortgage law. Only some areas will be 
covered by the Common Frame of Reference, aimed at streamlining European 
private law and the creation of more consistency and coherence in this legal 
field.56 Most of these areas are or will be governed by their own specific rules 
of property law. This raises the pressing need to develop a vision on the future 
of European property law. Without a vision on the future the various areas will 
be developed in an area-autonomous way and national legal systems will, 
given the inconsistence and incoherence resulting from such an area-
autonomous development, show more and more resistance against European 
                                                                                                                                                      
17530>. 
56 Cf. S. van Erp, DCFR and property law: the need for consistency and coherence, in: 
R. Schulze (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and existing EC contract law (Munich: 
Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008), p. 249 ff. The DCFR mainly focuses on the 
law of obligations. The question has been raised whether the CFR could be limited to 
the law of obligations – in the German law sense: including transfer of claims – only. 
The answer must clearly be negative. See Chr. von Bar and U. Drobnig, Study on 
property law and non-contractual liability law as they relate to contract law, submitted 
to the European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection/Directorate-General, 
SANCO B5-1000/02/000574, to be found at: <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_ 
int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/study.pdf>; see also F.J. Säcker, Vom deut-
schen Sachenrecht zu einem europäischen Vermögensrecht, in: M. Stathopoulos et al., 
Festschrift für Apostolos Georgiades zum 70. Geburtstag (Athens, Munich and Bern: 
Ant. N. Sakkoulas, C.H. Beck and Stämpfli, 2006), p. 359 ff., who writes on p. 306: 
„Eine isolierte Reform des Schuldrechts ohne ergänzende Reform des Sachenrechts 
versteinert das Abstraktionsprinzip, perpetuiert das unkoordinierte Nebeneinander 
schuldvertraglicher und sachenrechtlicher Binnenbeziehungen zwischen den Kontra-
henten dinglicher Dauerrechtsverhältnisse (z.B. Dienstbarkeit, Nießbrauch) und be-
lastet die Rechtsanwendung mit der Frage nach der Anwendbarkeit schuldrechtlicher 
Normen im Bereich des Sachenrechts zur Schließung unerwünschter Regelungslü-
cken.“ 
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rule making. Tensions already exist between national property law and Euro-
pean property law, which became clear when the directive on financial collat-
eral arrangements had to be implemented.57 What we need is, as I already de-
fended in my Walter van Gerven lecture, an osmosis of national and European 
property law, in which the two systems adapt to one another.58 This will result 
if comparative legal research will show “bottom up” what the various property 
law systems in Europe share (and do not share!) and if European legislative 
measures “top down” incorporate, or at least take into account, the results of 
such comparative legal research.  
This need to create an osmosis is my starting point for the development of a 
vision on the future of European property law. In this part of my contribution I 
will describe what I see as the emerging European model of property law, 
while realising that a more detailed study will be necessary before final con-
clusions can be drawn.59 
b. European property law: form 
Not only with regard to substance do the various European legal traditions, at 
least on a technical level, differ to a larger or a lesser extent, but also with re-
gard to form. The continental legal systems are generally more inclined to 
regulate property law in statutory format, preferably even in all enveloping 
codes, whereas the Common Law tradition is characterised by development on 
a case by case basis. The latter also applies to mixed jurisdictions, the prime 
example being Scottish law. This does not mean, of course, that case law is of 
less relevance in the continental legal traditions or that statutes are less impor-
tant in the Common Law or in mixed legal systems. I need only refer to the 
German case law concerning the transfer of ownership for security purposes 
and the so-called “expectation rights” (“Anwartschaftsrechte”) or to the Eng-
lish Law of Property Act 1925, the English Land Registration Act 2002, the 
Scottish Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. Scotland Act of 2000 and the draft 
Irish Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006 (abolishing feudal tenure 
                                                 
57 For the Netherlands see L.P.W. van Vliet, De financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomst, een 
tussenbalans, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 2005, p. 190 ff. 
58 Cf. the views on a “differenzierte Integration” by P. Jung, Differenzierte Integration 
im Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht – Eine Einführung in die Thematik, in: P. Jung and Chr. 
Baldus (eds.), Differenzierte Integration im Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (Munich: Sellier 
European Law Publishers, 2007, p. 1 ff. 
59 See also F.J. Säcker, Vom deutschen Sachenrecht zu einem europäischen Vermögens-
recht, p. 373 ff. 
 26
in Ireland).60 What would be the best form for a possible European property 
law: development through legislation (directives or regulations), case law or a 
mixture of both? 
In my view, only binding regulation can and will be effective in overcom-
ing the major obstacles to harmonisation or unification. The bridge over the 
gap between the various property law traditions in Europe can, therefore, only 
be a statutory framework. This should, however, not be a framework in the 
sense of the continental civil codes, i.e. a comprehensive work of legislation in 
which the whole area of property law is covered. What I am thinking about is 
an open-ended statutory framework, more in line with the idea of “principles” 
in the sense in which this term is used by the drafters of the Common Frame of 
Reference.61 In this framework a distinction must be made between commer-
cial transactions (B2B) and consumer transactions (B2C) and, with respect to 
commercial transactions, a further distinction should be made between transac-
tions concerning only large enterprises and transactions concerning a large en-
terprise and a small or medium sized enterprise (SME). The overall structure 
could be that in a “titre préliminaire” the leading principles and ground rules 
of European property law are being restated followed by general provisions on 
the creation, transfer and extinguishment of property rights. In special parts 
rules can be given on security interests generally (e.g. the principle of acces-
sority under which a security right lapses when the secured debt has been re-
paid, of course with the various exceptions allowed e.g. with regard to enter-
prise financing) and on security interests on immovables, movables and claims. 
In this way a structured set of rules can be given.   
c. European property law: substance 
As preliminary remarks it should be noted (1) that at the level of leading prin-
ciples (principle of numerus clausus and the principle of transparency, i.e. 
specificity and publicity) the various property law traditions in Europe share 
all these principles. The various legal traditions also share the ground rules of 
property law: (1) nemo dat (or, as a civil lawyer would say: nemo plus), (2) an 
older property right has priority over a younger property right (prior tempore, 
potior iure), (3) creation of a limited property right with the permission of the 
                                                 
60 FDor the English acts, see the website of the British and Irish Legal Information Insti-
tute: <http://www.bailii.org/>; for the Scottish act see: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/ 
Topics/Justice/Civil/17975/Abolition> and for the Irish bill: <http://www.oireachtas.ie/ 
viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2006/3106/document1.htm>. 
61 Chr. von Bar, H. Beale, E. Clive and H. Schulte-Nölke, Draft Common Frame of Re-
ference, Interim Outline Edition, Introduction, p. 8/9. 
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older property right holder creates priority for the holder of the limited prop-
erty right and (4) property rights are given special protection. Mainly due to a 
different legal history, however, the technical rules of the property law tradi-
tions in Europe differ. A European property law should be built upon what is 
shared at the level of principles and ground rules, trying to overcome differ-
ences at a technical level, caused in part by diverging policy choices made in 
the several traditions. In my view the following areas can be mentioned in 
which policy choices are made: (1) Does a separation exist between the law of 
obligations (contract and tort) and the law of property? (2) Is ownership de-
fined as a uniform right (i.e. not to be fragmented in a feudal sense or accord-
ing to the will of the parties)? (3) Is ownership protected, when does commerce 
or the general interest prevail?  
In the following sections I will, first of all, discuss how these policy choices 
could be made at a European level. The choices made will have a direct impact 
on how the leading property law principles will be applied. I will then discuss 
the range of flexibility which can be found within these leading property law 
principles. As far as the ground rules are concerned, I would like to refer to 
what I remarked earlier in my Van Gerven lecture.62 Finally, I should add that 
the use of “standards” as can be found in contract law is not of the same impor-
tance in property law as it is in contract law. A standard is an open ended 
norm, the application of which depends upon policy weighing factors. An e-
xample of such a standard is the good faith requirement as a prerequisite for 
the protection of third parties in cases where their counterpart lacked the power 
to dispose. What good faith requires will depend upon a mix of subjective and 
objective arguments, such as: Did the third party make inquiries about the legal 
status of the transferor? Was the legal status of the transferor made public, for 
example through registration? Should the third party have become suspicious 
(e.g. because of a very low purchase price)? Is the protection of ownership 
considered to be of prime importance and a fundamental human right or is pro-
tection of commerce seen as vital?63 Standards only begin to play their role af-
ter the leading principles, the policy choices and the ground rules have been 
established. Within the framework of this contribution standards are not further 
discussed. 
                                                 
62 European and national property law: Osmosis or growing antagonism, p. 16 ff. 
63 Cf. P.J. Pipková, Gutgläubiger Eigentumserwerb als gesetzliches Limit des verfas-
sungsrechtlich gewährleisteten Rechts auf Eigentum. Die Situation in der tschechische 
Rechtsordnung gesehen durch die Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgerichtes, Europe-
an Review of Private Law 2008, p. 313 ff. 
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c. Policy choices 
1. More freedom of contract in the law of property 
One of the major obstacles to harmonisation of property law in Europe is the 
rift that came into existence between Common Law and Civil Law after the 
French Revolution with regard to the (dis)continuity of the feudal system. Eng-
land, Wales and Ireland still have a property law system rooted in feudal his-
tory, whereas the feudal system was abolished on the continent and replaced 
by a system rooted in Roman law. The European model must, therefore, be so 
open that it creates a framework for both major European legal traditions. This 
will mean that, from a Civil Law perspective, certain feudal elements and a 
less dogmatically rigid kind of legal thinking will have to be reintroduced and 
that, from a Common Law perspective, certain Roman law elements and a 
more dogmatically coherent style of reasoning will have to be accepted. 
A first and very basic element of this system is the typically continental 
strict separation between the law of obligations and the law of property. Per-
haps German law is the legal system in which this separation has been adhered 
to most strictly, resulting in a, what I have called, “triple layered” theory of ab-
straction.64 Not only are the law of obligations and the law of property sepa-
rated, but contracts do not have any property law consequences (for such con-
sequences a further legal act is necessary) and once a transfer has taken place 
invalidity of the underlying agreement becomes irrelevant. This triple layered 
theory of abstraction should, however, not be chosen as the basis for a Euro-
pean property law. First of all, English law does not make such a strict separa-
tion between the law of obligations and the law of property and in several Civil 
Law systems an attempt is made to contractualise property law. Property secu-
rity arrangements are sometimes replaced by contractual arrangements.65 Sec-
ondly, in a large part of Europe contracts do have property consequences. I re-
fer to the countries with a so-called consensual system of transfer. Finally, sev-
eral of the so-called tradition systems are of a causal nature, meaning that 
problems concerning the underlying agreement affect the transfer based upon 
that agreement. Perhaps a more overall approach should be taken. This could 
look like as follows. 
                                                 
64 S. van Erp, DCFR and property law: the need for consistency and coherence, ibid., p. 
250. 
65 See for Dutch law R.M. Wibier, Alternatieven voor zekerheid op bankrekeningen 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2007). 
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If one analyses the separation between the law of obligations and the law of 
property further one sees the following image appearing.66 The starting point 
in private law – and this can already be found in the first chapter of von Savi-
gny’s “System des heutigen römischen Rechts” – are the legal relations be-
tween people.67 These legal relations can be very open (this is the area of tort 
liability) or more closed (this is the area of contract). Contracts may only bind 
the parties (“privity of contract”) or may affect third parties. This effect to-
wards third parties may be contractual in nature (under certain conditions ex-
emption clauses may sometimes be invoked against only a few or a limited 
group of third parties), or of a proprietary nature (affecting a substantial group 
of third parties or even “the world”).68 If parties can create rights, which bind 
all non-contracting parties, then a property right has been established. In other 
words: in this approach no separation exists between contract law and property 
law, but a borderline area in which “relative” personal rights are at one end of 
the spectrum and “absolute” property rights at the other end. A contractual 
right may even develop from a relative right into an absolute right. This ex-
plains what U.S. lawyers call the difference between “attachment” of an Arti-
cle 9 UCC personal property security right and “perfection” of such a right. At-
tachment creates a personal relationship between the parties, affecting certain 
other third parties and consequently has a limited proprietary effect. Perfection 
is the final stage of ‘proprietarisation’ (in German: “Verdinglichung”), as it 
creates a property effect against all third parties.69  
                                                 
66 Cf. for the Netherlands E.B. Rank-Berenschot, Over de scheidslijn tussen goederen- 
en verbintenissenrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992) and for Belgium V. Sagaert, Het 
goederenrecht als open systeem van verbintenissen?: poging tot een nieuwe 
kwalificatie van de vermogensrechten, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 2005, p. 983 ff. 
67 F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Erster Band (Berlin: Beit 
und Comp., 1840), p. 6 ff., to be found electronically at the website of the Max-
Planck-Institute for European Legal history: <http://dlib-pr.mpier.mpg.de/index.htm.>  
68 On the third party effect of certain exemption clauses (the so-called “Himalaya 
clauses”) see Adler v Dickson (The Himalaya) Court of Appeal 29 October 1954, 
[1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep 267, [1955] 1 QB 158, to be found electronically at: 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1954/3.html> and see for U.S. law Nor-
folk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., U.S. Supreme Court 9 Novem-
ber 2004, (No. 02-1028), 543 U.S. 14 (2004), to be found electronically at the website 
of the Legal Information Institute of Cornell University Law School: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1028.ZS.html>. 
69 The text of Article 9 UCC can be found at the website of the Legal Information Insti-
tute of the Cornell University Law School: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/ 
overview.html>.  
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2. Flexibilisation of the concept of ownership  
With regard to the concept of ownership and its role in a European property 
law two questions can be asked. Should we, at a European level, really make a 
sharp distinction between unitary (Civil Law) ownership and fragmented 
(Common Law) ownership? Does the so-called unitary concept of ownership, 
as can be found in Civil Law systems after the French Revolution, perhaps 
need rethinking in the light of modern economic developments, especially 
globalisation? A unitary concept of ownership means that – except for cases of 
co-ownership in which the co-owners share full ownership rights – only one 
person can be owner of an object. As such, this approach is a reaction against 
the feudal concept of “fragmented” ownership that prevailed before the French 
Revolution under which several people could claim (different kinds of) owner-
ship with regard to land. The acceptance of fragmented ownership can still be 
found in the Common Law, where, although the feudal system has lost its im-
pact as a system of governance, the feudal concept of ownership was never 
abandoned. A prime example is Ireland, which is considering to abolish the 
feudal system, while at the same time maintaining feudal legal concepts.70 As 
a result under English, Irish or U.S. law various types of ownership are still 
possible (examples: freehold, leasehold, equitable entitlements under a trust). It 
is even questioned if the word “ownership” has any meaning in English land 
law.71 This is a debate I will not enter into, except that my approach here is 
                                                 
70 See the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2006. Part 2 of this act is entitled 
“Ownership of Land”. The parliamentary history can be found at: <http://www. 
oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2006/3106/document1.htm>. 
Sections 9 and 10 read in part:  
“Section 9.—(1) From the commencement of this Part, ownership of land comprises 
the estates and interests specified in this Part.   
(2) In so far as it survives, feudal tenure is abolished. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not affect— (...)  
(b) the concept of an estate in section 10, (...).  
Section 10. – (1) The concept of an estate in land is retained and, subject to this Act, 
continues with the interests specified in this Part to denote the nature and extent of 
land ownership.  
(2) Such an estate retains its pre-existing characteristics, but without any tenurial inci-
dents. (...)”. 
71 Cf. J.W. Harris, Ownership of land in English law, in: N. MacCormick and P. Birks, 
The legal mind. Essays for Tony Honoré (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 143 ff. 
On p. 159 Harris writes:   
“For many textbook writers, it is enough to establish that no one is ever owner of land 
to point out that, in English law, ownership of land is split and restricted. It is split by 
the doctrine of estates, which recognizes a temporal sequence of rights to possess, and 
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rather pragmatic. I consider “ownership” to be the strongest right a person can 
have with regard to an object, whether you call this right a freehold, title, pro-
priété or Eigentum.72 
Traditionally, since the French Revolution civil lawyers have rejected the 
re-introduction of some form of fragmented ownership. It seems as if the Civil 
Law is afraid to “unbundle” ownership, in order to avoid a situation in which 
old feudal concepts might revive. This negative Civil Law approach towards 
fragmented ownership creates more and more problems in cases where the 
most practical solution to a given problem would be to divide ownership rights 
between various stakeholders, without creating a limited property right, such as 
a usufruct or a pledge. From a comparative viewpoint various techniques could 
be used to reach this result. In several Civil Law systems trust-like devices 
have been developed to create a situation in which, although unitary ownership 
rests with the trustee/manager, this ownership is limited by the purpose for 
which the trustee became owner. A recent example is the introduction of the 
“fiducie” in French law.73 These trust-like devices create a new type of owner-
ship, which is purpose-limited, sometimes called the “Civil Law trust”.74 A 
                                                                                                                                                      
it is restricted both by a host of use and security rights vested in someone other than 
the alleged owner and by rules of private and public law banning various kinds of ex-
ploitation of the land. In such discussions, what is presupposed is what may be called 
a totality conception of ownership. One begins with the idea that an ‘owner’ could do 
absolutely anything with or to his land, and demonstrates that no such totality of privi-
leges is admitted. If that is what ownership means, it is not a conception internal to 
English law or to any other system of law. (…) I would suggest that the terminology 
of totality ownership is legitimate, provided its proper juristic significance is borne in 
mind. It is a concept employed, not within any system of law, but within the legal sci-
ence as a base-line for setting out and comparing the import of particular provisions.”  
72 Of course awareness should exist with regard to the differences between these con-
cepts at a technical level, but still from a pragmatic (one could also say: functional) 
viewpoint these rights have a comparable effect. The base line is that a holder of such 
right can enforce that right against all others, unless someone else has a property right 
which is given preference. A pledgee can seize and sell property which belongs to the 
pledgor in case of failure to repay, e.g., a loan. See for a debate in English law on 
whether ownership is a legal concept or not: J.W. Harris, Ownership of land in 
English law, already referred to above. 
73 Loi n° 2007-211 du 19 février 2007 instituant la fiducie, J.O n° 44 du 21 février 2007 
page 3052. The fiducie is defined as (article 2011 French Civil Code) “l'opération par 
laquelle un ou plusieurs constituants transfèrent des biens, des droits ou des sûretés, 
ou un ensemble de biens, de droits ou de sûretés, présents ou futurs, à un ou plusieurs 
fiduciaires qui, les tenant séparés de leur patrimoine propre, agissent dans un but dé-
terminé au profit d'un ou plusieurs bénéficiaires.” 
74 See D.J. Hayton and S.C.J.J. Kortmann, Principles of European trust law (The Hague 
and Deventer: Kluwer Law International and W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1999). 
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further example of techniques to unbundle ownership are financial collateral 
arrangements. These arrangements, which secure financial transactions be-
tween in particular large financial institutions, have now been regulated 
Europe-wide as a result of European legislation. Financial collateral arrange-
ments have strong proprietary aspects and may result in a transfer of ownership 
or in a special type of pledge. In the Netherlands it has been debated whether 
the introduction of this type of arrangement de facto meant that ownership for 
security purposes was re-introduced, after it was banned when the new Civil 
Code entered into force (the so-called “fiducia ban”). Financial collateral ar-
rangements are also an illustration of purpose-limited ownership.75 A further 
example, showing economic pressure to re-introduce some form of divided 
ownership, can be found outside the financial world. In order to create an in-
ternal European energy market, there is growing pressure by the European 
Commission on Member States to separate, on the one hand, transmission and 
transportation of energy from, on the other hand, production and supply of en-
ergy. The infrastructure (physical network) and the use of the infrastructure 
(supply of electricity and gas) have to be “unbundled”. This is laid down in 
European legislation: the first and second electricity and gas directives.76 In 
this way, national or regional monopolies of energy suppliers, which usually at 
the same time both own and exploit the network, can be broken down into in-
frastructure and use of the infrastructure. The infrastructure, consisting of, 
among other elements, the physical networks (cables, pipes), should be acces-
sible to all energy providers, thus allowing the entering of new market partici-
pants in formerly closed national markets. The way this is done is left to the 
Member States. Unbundling does not have to take place through a full transfer 
of ownership. Compelling the Member States to a transfer of ownership would, 
furthermore, not be possible under European law. Article 295 EC does not al-
low the European Community to interfere in the property law systems of the 
Member States in as far as this would have an impact on who owns the net-
work.  
                                                 
75 Cf. on financial collateral arrangements Th.R.M.P. Keijser, Financial collateral arran-
gements: the European collateral directive considered from a property and insolvency 
law perspective (Deventer: Kluwer, 2006).  
76 Cf. the latest directives: Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electric-
ity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ 2003, L 176/37; Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003, L 
176/57. 
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Why do civil lawyers feel so hostile towards accepting fragmented owner-
ship? Property law as it developed on the continent of Europe after the French 
Revolution has two major general characteristics.77 It is, first of all, a reaction 
against the pre-existing law, which was still rooted in the feudal system. Sec-
ondly, it is heavily influenced by Roman legal thinking as further developed by 
in particular academic lawyers. Feudalism had developed in large parts of 
Western Europe as a system of administration, jurisdiction, military service 
and land tenure. Gradually, the first three elements became less important, but 
the system remained influential with regard to land tenure. Feudalism had cre-
ated a situation in which several people at the same time could be entitled to 
the use of land, all of them claiming some form of ownership. Ownership was 
divided – and already the terminology shows how Roman legal thinking began 
to influence the interpretation of feudal property law concepts – into dominium 
directum (formal ownership) and dominium utile (actual ownership). After the 
French Revolution those who had dominium utile became sole owner.78 Own-
ership became unqualified dominium or, to put it differently, dominium out-
right. The same happened recently (2004) in Scotland as a result of the Aboli-
tion of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act.79 Given the ideals of freedom and 
equality no class distinctions were made anymore. Property law should hence-
forth apply to all and should forbid that one person would be obliged to do 
something for another against his or her will. This is why property law to a 
large degree restricts the possibility to create a duty to act (positive duties), 
which can particularly be seen in the law of servitudes. 
Given the growing acceptance of, for example, trust-like arrangements, 
such as the French fiducie, and the “unbundling” process that can be seen in 
the European energy market, the question could be raised whether Civil Law 
systems are perhaps returning to acceptance of fragmented ownership, thus re-
verting to a pre-existing feudal “Ius Commune” all over Europe. This has been 
done by the Belgian legal historian Heirbaut and by the leading French prop-
                                                 
77 B. Terrat, Du régime de la propriété dans le Code Civil, in: Le Code Civil 1804 – 
1904, Livre du centenaire, publié par la Société d’Études Législatives, Tome Premier, 
Généralités – Études spéciales (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1904), p. 329 ff.; R. Libcha-
ber, La recodification du droit des biens, in: Le Code civil 1804 – 2004, Livre du bi-
centenaire (Paris: Dalloz and Litec, 2004), p. 297 ff. 
78 Cf. the Decree abolishing the feudal system of 11 August, 1789. 
79 2000 asp 5. Section 2 (1) states: “An estate of dominium utile of land shall, on the ap-
pointed day, cease to exist as a feudal estate but shall forthwith become the ownership 
of the land and, in so far as is consistent with the provisions of this Act, the land shall 
be subject to the same subordinate real rights and other encumbrances as was the es-
tate of dominium utile.” Cf. K.G.C. Reid, Vassals no more: Feudalism and post-
feudalism in Scotland, European Review of Private Law 2003, p. 282 ff. 
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erty lawyer Crocq.80 Heirbaut’s answer is positive, Crocq in his book Propriété 
et Garantie is more negative. 81 Crocq asks himself the question whether the 
French legal distinction between “propriété juridique” and “propriété 
économique” means something more than expressing an economic reality. In 
his own words: “Peut-on au regard du droit civil (et non plus seulement du 
droit fiscal ou du droit comptable) parler de ‘propriété de la valeur’ et de 
‘propriété de l’utilité, d’une ‘nouvelle relation aux biens’?” He then refers to 
the “propriétés simultanées” under the “ancien régime”. By “propriété simul-
tanées” he means the “pluralité de propriétés différentes portant chacune sur 
une utilité distincte du fonds”.82 In his view the recognition of a new type of 
simultaneous ownership would violate public policy, as it would imply a return 
to pre-revolutionary law and it would violate the unitary conception of owner-
ship. Recognition of simultaneous ownership would also be problematic in the 
light of the numerus clausus principle. Nevertheless, French law does provide 
a further example, next to the fiducie, that perhaps the fear of pre-revolutionary 
property law is diminishing. Reference can be made to the introduction of 
“mulitpropriété” or timeshare in the Code de la Consommation. Article L. 121-
60 gives the following definition: “Est soumis aux dispositions de la présente 
section tout contrat ou groupe de contrats, conclu à titre onéreux, par lequel 
un professionnel confère à un consommateur, directement ou indirectement, la 
jouissance d'un ou plusieurs biens immobiliers à usage d'habitation, par pé-
riodes déterminées ou déterminables, pour au moins trois années ou pour une 
durée indéterminée.” Such a type of ownership makes it possible to provide 
the exclusive use of an apartment or house to several acquirers for a returning 
limited period.83 As such this contradicts the traditional unitary concept of 
                                                 
80 D. Heirbaut, Feudal law: the real Ius Commune of property in Europe, or: should we 
reintroduce duplex dominium?, European Review of Private Law 2003, p. 301 ff.; P. 
Crocq, Propriété et Garantie (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1995). 
81 D. Heirbaut, Feudal Law : the real Ius Commune of property in Europe, p. 318 ff.; P. 
Crocq, Propriété et Garantie, p. 192 ff. 
82 P. Crocq, Propriété et Garantie, p. 147, quoting A.-M. Patault, Introduction historique 
au droit des biens (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), p. 15. Patault also 
speaks about “maîtrise” when she discusses the division of powers inherent in the feu-
dal system; see Introduction historique, p. 37 ff. For a further analysis of the “proprié-
tés simultanées” see also A.-M. Patault, La propriété non exclusive au XIXe siècle: 
histoire de la dissociation juridique de l’immeuble, Revue Historique de Droit Fran-
çais et Étranger, 1983, p. 217 ff. See further D. Aubin, S. Nahrath and F. Varone, Pay-
sage et propriété : un retour vers la pluria domina?, published electronically on the 
website “Property Rights, Economics and Environment” (French language version): 
<http://www.environnement-propriete.org/francais/index.htm>.  
83 Cf. Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 
1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating 
 35
ownership under which only one person can be the owner of an object for 
unlimited duration.  
Finally, reference should be made to what Bergel writes in his general re-
port on “nouveaux biens” in the volume La Propriété, published by the Asso-
ciation Henri Capitant.84 New objects of property law may need new property 
law rules, as the existing rules are written from a nineteenth century perspec-
tive according to which the most important object of property law was the cor-
poreal object of land and certainly not any incorporeal objects. The rise of new 
objects, such as emission rights, makes rethinking of the unitary concept of 
ownership in the Civil Law – again – unavoidable. Flexibilisation of that con-
cept would result in an alignment with the Common Law and thus promote the 
creation of a European system of property law. 
3. Protection of ownership, commerce and the general interest 
With regard to the third policy choice, it can be observed that everywhere the 
interest of an owner that he will not lose his right of ownership involuntarily is 
weighed against the interest of an innocent third party, who dealt with a party a 
non domino in good faith assuming he would acquire ownership, and against 
the state, who claims property in the general interest. The starting point in any 
European legal system will be the protection of ownership, which fits within 
the classical model of property law and results from international and/or con-
stitutional law. I need only refer to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This balance will have to be decided upon be-
fore any technical harmonisation or unification can begin. In my view, it is ex-
actly this policy choice that will have to be considered before a decision can 
made on a European model for transfer systems with regard to, for example, 
movables. Causal transfer systems tend to protect owners, abstract transfer sys-
tems tend to protect third parties in the interest of commerce. Each transfer 
system will need a counterbalance to prevent that one particular interest is 
overprotected. In the case of causal systems these are the third party protection 
rules, in the case of an abstract system this could be a doctrine, as can be found 
in German law, on Fehleridentität, protecting the original owner in situations 
                                                                                                                                                      
to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis, OJ L 
280, 29.10.1994, p. 83 ff. For an overview of how the directive has been implemented 
in the Member States see the Consumer Law Compendium (prepared under the aus-
pices of the European Commission): <http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/index.html>.  
84 La Propriété. Journées Vietnamiennes. Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant des 
Amis de la Culture Juridique Française. Tome LIII, 2003 (Paris: Société de Législa-
tion Comparée, 2006), p. 203 ff., 220. 
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of grave defects of consent.85 
d. Leading principles 
1. Towards a numerus quasi-clausus of property rights  
According to the numerus clausus doctrine, the number and content of prop-
erty rights is restricted by mandatory law; also the way limited property rights 
are created, transferred and terminated is laid down in mandatory (procedural) 
rules.86 In Civil Law systems the starting point is that the list of existing prop-
erty rights can only be extended by the legislature, although also some highly 
interesting examples can be found in which the judiciary added property rights 
the list. I refer to the acceptance under German law (and under Dutch law be-
fore the enactment of the new Civil Code) of the transfer of ownership for se-
curity purposes.87 Although the numerus clausus principle seems to be more a 
Civil Law than a Common Law notion, it can still also be found in the Com-
mon Law.88 In the Common Law, however, the judiciary’s role is leading. 
Reference can be made to the acceptance of the floating charge (a general se-
curity interest) in the famous Re Panama case.89 Goode has called the floating 
charge “one of equity’s most brilliant creations.”90 I already defended the idea 
that if Civil Law systems would become more open towards accepting new 
                                                 
85 For a comparative study of transfer systems see L.P.W. van Vliet, Transfer of mo-
vables in German, French, English and Dutch law (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2000); 
V. Sagaert, Consensual v. Delivery systems in European private law – Consensus a-
bout tradition?, in: W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds.), Rules for the transfer of movables, 
p. 9 ff.; S. Bartels, An abstract or a causal system, in: W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds.), 
Rules for the transfer of movables, p. 59 ff. On the policy choices involved see: A. Sa-
lomons, How to draft new rules on the bona fide acquisition of movables for Europe. 
Some remarks on method and content, in: W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds.), Rules for the 
transfer of movables, p. 141 ff. With regard to the doctrine of Fehleridentität see J.Th. 
Füller, Eigenständiges Sachenrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), p. 129 ff. 
86 S. van Erp, A Numerus quasi-clausus of property rights as a constitutive element of a 
future European property law?, Vol. 7.2, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 
(June 2003), <http://www.ejcl.org/72/art72-2.html>. 
87 For German law see Baur/Stürner, p. 706; for Dutch law see Hoge Raad 25 January 
1929, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1929, 616. 
88 See Keppel v. Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517 and Hill v. Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121, 
already referred to above. 
89 Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
90 R. Goode, The case for the abolition of the floating charge, in: J. Getzler and J. Payne, 
Company charges. Spectrum and beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
p. 11 ff., 11. 
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property rights – and, I would like to add, Common Law systems more open 
towards the importance of standardising such rights – also here common 
ground could be found upon which a European property law could be built. 
Furthermore, a connection exists with another policy choice mentioned earlier: 
the acceptance of more freedom of contract in property law, although I would 
not go as far as Säcker who has stated: “Das eher an archaische Rechtskul-
turen als eine moderne Kodifikation erinnernde Numerus-clausus-Prinzip 
sollte aufgegeben werden zugunsten einer Zulassung privatautonomer Gestal-
tungsfreiheit.”91 I would argue in favour of retaining the numerus clausus, not 
a s a hard and fast rule, but as a leading principle and therefore I would argue 
in favour of a “numerus quasi-clausus” of property rights.  
2 A more relaxed approach with regard to the principle of  
transparency: publicity and specificity 
Next to the principle of numerus clausus all property law traditions in Europe 
know the principle of specificity (it has to be clear as to which object a prop-
erty right exists) and the principle of publicity (the justification for the binding 
effect of a property right vis-à-vis third parties is that information on such a 
right is publicly available). Together these two principles can be subsumed un-
der the principle of transparency. What can be seen everywhere is that speci-
ficity, particularly in the area of security interests on movables and claims, is 
no longer applied in a very strict manner. I refer to the floating charge, the 
Globalzession under German law and the cession Dailly under French law, all 
of them resulting in an overall security interest on claims.92 What can also be 
observed as a general tendency is that information requirements are tailored 
more and more according to the relevant circle of third parties, which may be 
affected by a property right. If this circle is not the general public or creditors 
generally, but only specific creditors it will not always be necessary to make 
information available through, e.g., public registries. An example of the latter 
tendency is the Financial Collateral Directive.93 A further example is the grow-
ing acceptance of claim assignments without any requirement to inform the 
debtor. This makes informal bulk transfers of claims possible; such transfers 
take place, for example, as part of a securitisation arrangement. Not informing 
debtors provokes, of course, the need to give special protection to a debtor who 
in good faith pays the assignor instead of the assignee and hence pays the 
                                                 
91 Säcker, Vom deutschen Sachenrecht zu einem europäischen Vermögensrecht, p. 367. 
92 For German law cf. Schwab/Prütting, Sachenrecht, p. 329 ff.; for French law see Arti-
cles L-313-23 ff. Code Monétaire et Finacier. 
93 See Article 3 (1) of the Financial Collateral Directive.  
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“wrong” creditor. Such protection is not given on a property level, but on the 
level of the law of obligations.94 Protection on a property level would require 
the debtor to be informed about an assignment, so that he knows whom to pay. 
As the debtor is not informed, payment in good faith to the assignor results in a 
protection on the level of the law of obligations. The debtor is considered as 
having performed his obligation to pay and hence as being discharged. 
If third parties are not performed through public registries, this may pro-
voke the creation of private registries. Examples are agencies which register an 
rate credit. Although such an agency does not register whether and, if so, how 
such a credit is secured, still it might be clear to for example a credit institution 
that in practice no such credit will have been given without security. In that 
sense a transfer of ownership for security purposes or a non-possessory pledge 
might not be so “silent” or secret after all. The result of the latter development 
is, what might be called, a privatization of publicity.95 
3. Towards a less rigid application of principles? 
All these developments show that, when looking at both national as well as 
European property law, leading principles of property law are more and more 
applied in a less rigid and more tailored way. Leaving behind rigidity, would 
enable the development towards a truly European property law. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
A more flexible and less rigid approach to property law will create an atmos-
phere (or perhaps I should say: an attitude) which makes a more consistent and 
coherent European property law possible.96 A condition sine qua non will be 
that all major property law traditions will have to be able to recognise them-
selves in the new European property law. The framework will have to be laid 
down in statutory format, to accommodate the Civil Law systems. Within the 
statutory framework, however, considerable freedom will have to be given to 
courts, allowing further development through case law, in order to accommo-
                                                 
94 A.F. Salomons, Deformalisation of assignment law and the position of the debtor in 
European property law, European Review of Private Law 2007, p. 639 ff. 
95 S. van Erp, Personal and real security, in: J.M. Smits, Elgar Encyclopedia of Compa-
rative Law (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 517 ff. 
96 An interesting analysis on the attitude of French, German and English lawyers can be 
found in C. Valcke, Comparative history and internal view of French, German and 
English private law, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2006, p. 133 ff. 
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date the Common Law. For civil lawyers the role of the legislature will be less 
than strong what they are used to, whereas for common lawyers the role of the 
courts may be less than what that role is traditionally. 
Security interests are often seen as the nucleus of an emerging European 
property law. In this legal area consensus is building up that legal diversity is a 
hindrance to the further development of the internal market. So we do know 
where to begin (security interests), but do we also know where we will end? 
The creation of a security interest is in many legal systems inextricably linked 
to the general rules on transfer, particularly with regard to the formal require-
ments. Part of these formal requirements is, when for example a hypothec is 
created, public registration. Should, as a consequence, public registration sys-
tems also be unified? So far, the EULIS project is merely aimed at connecting 
the land registries on a technical basis, but the next stage in this process could 
go further.  
When we as European private lawyers analyse the direction in which Euro-
pean private law is moving, we should always bear in mind that by such analy-
sis we also contribute to the making of European private law. We are not com-
pletely outside the process, but we are also inside. In my view this demands 
that we reflect upon how to proceed with the development of European prop-
erty law. What is needed are signposts or, to put it in more idealistic terms, a 
vision. That vision should always be built upon the values and freedoms laid 
down in the European treaties. For property law it is of enormous importance 
to realise that these treaties create, what German lawyers call, an economic 
constitution. One of the cornerstones of this economic constitution is freedom 
of ownership and the resulting protection of ownership. Formulating a vision 
also requires Partiturtreue, if I may use a term from classical music. Although 
interpretations of a score may differ, it should never be forgotten that we are 
all interpreting the same European treaties. To put it differently: Every model 
of European property law that is developed shows a different view of the ca-
thedral, to refer to a series of paintings of the façade of Rouen cathedral by 
Claude Monet, an image used by Calabresi and Melamed in their famous arti-
cle on property and liability rules, published in the Harvard Law Review of 
1972.97 European property law cannot be developed, if we remain thinking as 
national lawyers arguing according to choices made in our national legal sys-
tems. Particularly in property law, we need to understand the leading princi-
ples, underlying policy choices and ground rules, as can be found in the vari-
ous European legal traditions. These are the signposts we need. Based upon 
                                                 
97 G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One 
view of the cathedral, Harvard Law Review 1972, p. 1089 ff. 
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these principles, policies and rules various choices at a more technical level 
can be made.98 The future will show if ground breaking initiatives in this area 
of the law at the end of the day were taken by academic working groups, such 
as the Study Group on a European Civil Code, the European legislator or the 
European judiciary: national courts sitting as European courts and the ECJ.99 
What we need now is a good starting point from which we can really begin to 
build a European property law. Security interests are certainly a secure start. 
                                                 
98 Cf. the contributions in H.C. Sigman and E.-M. Kieninger (eds.), Cross-border securi-
ty over tangibles (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007) and the various 
contributions to W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds.), Rules for the transfer of movables. A 
candidate for European harmonisation or national reform? (Munich: Sellier, European 
Law Publishers, 2008). 
99 See the draft report on the role of the national judge in the European judicial system 
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